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WASHINGTON LEGISLATION-1953
In this series of articles, the faculty of the University of Washington
School of Law analyzes the enactments of the Thirty-third Session of
the Washington State Legislature. Coverage is limited to those statutes
having the greatest significance to the practicing lawyer.
CIVIL RIGHTS
Racial Discrimination.The 1909 statute forbidding denial of service,
etc., at "places of public resort" because of "race, creed, or color," has
been amended' by providing very broad definitions of all its terms,
definitions which, however, are no broader than could reasonably be
given the general terms of the original statute.' The legislature failed to
provide a civil remedy to redress the private injury, which remedy
would probably be a more potent deterrent than the threat of criminal
prosecution for a misdemeanor, the sanction provided. The courts had
created a tort remedy to implement the old statue.' It is to be hoped
that the new statutb will not be construed as an implied legislative
repudiation of this judicial invention.
JOHN B. SHoLLEY
1 RCW 9.91.010 [RRS § 2686].

1953, c. 87.
fact, the older statute had, because it was a criminal statute, been rather
narrowly construed, even in civil litigation. See Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194, 210
Pac. 374 (1922).
'Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921).
2L.
8 In

CORPORATIONS
Corporate Charitable Contributions. The Washington state legislature in its 1953 session adopted an act specifically authorizing corpora-
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tions to make contributions for charitable and other public purposes.'
By this action Washington joins an ever increasing number of states
which have enacted similar legislation.2
Although the Supreme Court of Washington has not had occasion
to rule upon the propriety of charitable or similar contributions by
corporations in the absence of such statutory authorization, it is most
probable that it would in large measure have recognized the propriety
of such corporate action without the aid of the statute. It is common
knowledge that present day corporations do contribute substantially
to the support of charitable and public enterprises and of recent years
the legality of such contributions has not been seriously challenged.3
Nevertheless, legal advisers to corporations are, in the absence of statutory authorization, confronted by some doubts as to legality of such
contributions, particularly where no direct benefit to the corporation
is demonstrable.
The historic and current rules on the subject have been thoroughly
reviewed in three articles published in the American Bar Association
Journal in 1952.' In view of the comprehensive treatment of the subject in those articles, a detailed survey of the problem here would be
largely repetitive. In general, however, the problem involves the ultra
vzres doctrine. In the early history of the modern business corporation,
there was much litigation concerning corporate action which was asserted to be invalid because it was beyond the purposes and powers of
the corporation. The courts were disposed to take a narrow view of the
proper scope of corporate activity I Action not directly related to the
business operations of the corporation was frequently enjoined or declared unenforceable by or against the corporation. By the same line
of reasoning, corporate expenditures which were not directly designed
I2 L.

1953, c. 213.
Bleicken, Corporate Contributions to Charities The Modern Rule, 38 A.B.A. JOURNAL 999 (1952) cites statutes of twenty-four states and Hawaii which in varying
terms authorize charitable contributions by corporations.
8 Sec. 23 (q) of the Internal Revenue Code permits a corporation to deduct charitable contributions up to five per cent of the corporation's net income in computing its
income tax.
6 Bleicken, Corporate Contributionsto Charities"The Modern Rule, 38 A.B.A. JOURNAL 999 (1952) , Bell, CorporationSupport of Education--The Legal Basis, 38 A.B.A.
JOURNAL 119 (1952) , de Capriles and Garrett, Legality of Corporate Support to Educatson. A Survey of Current Development, 38 A.B.A. JoURNAL 209 (1952). See also
Cousens, How Far CorporationsMay Contributeto Charity, 35 Va. L. Rav. 401 (1949).
5 An excellent example of the extremely strict views of an earlier period is Davis v.
Old Colony Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 248, 41 Am. Rep. 221 (1881) where it was held
that the railroad could not contribute to the support of a World Peace Jubilee and
International Music Festival to be held in Boston, even though it appeared that patronage of the railroad might be increased by the holding of these events.
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to produce corporate income were declared improper. Even as late as
a generation ago, the study of corporate law was concerned in substantial part with the ultra vires doctrine. At the present time, however, the
ultra vires doctrine has declined in practical importance until it has
become a mere shadow of its former self.
The reasons for the decline of the doctrine are several. The disposition of present day corporate draftsmen is to broaden the statement
of corporate purposes so as to permit a much wider variety of activities
than was indicated by the charters issued by state legislatures or obtained under earlier general incorporation statutes. It is, however,
doubtful if this practice has done much to meet the charitable or
public contribution problem, since charter provisions specifically dealing with that subject are seldom encountered. The real inroads on the
ultra vires doctrine so far as this specific problem is concerned have
come from a general change in judicial and popular views of the proper
range of corporate activity. More and more the courts have extended
the concept of implied corporate powers and, more to the point, recognized that the welfare of the general community is a matter of interest and importance to the corporation which operates within it. In
effect the modern judicial attitude is a paraphrase of the recently widely quoted statement of Mr. Charles E. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense,
to the effect that what is good for General Motors is good for the country. The judicial praraphrases would be that what is good for the community is beneficial to the corporation.
There have of course always been and will continue to be contributions by coporations which, although broadly classified as charitable,
are in fact quite directly related to the business activities of the corporation. For example, contributions by General Electric Company
toward research or even general study in schools of electrical engineering bear such a patent relationship to the corporate business as to
satisfy all but the most technical advocates of a rigid ultra 'vires rule.
When, however, no such direct relationship exists as, for example, when
the same corporation contributes to the support of a college generally,
or to its department of philosophy, or to a children's hospital or to
the community fund, a larger view of corporate functions and permissible activities is necessary. Although custom has long since vindicated financial contributions in some of these areas, community fund contributions, for example, doubts have remained as the possibility of
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demonstrating apparent corporate benefits becomes more remote. The
statute is designed to remove those doubts.
Parenthetically it should be observed that such concern as may have
been felt by corporate directors and their advisers is not entirely limited to the ultra vires problem. Even assuming that the court might
hold a particular contribution to be intra vtres, there is always the
possibility of adverse criticism by corporate shareholders as to the wisdom of he contribution both as to amount and the recipient.
For the most part, statutory enactments authorizing contributions
have been quite brief. The Washington statute, on the contrary is
quite detailed.8 The act (1) declares that charitable contributions made
in accordance therewith are a valid and proper use of corporate funds
and are approved as a matter of public policy unless forbidden by express charter provision, (2) states that such contributions shall be
deemed to inure to the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders;
(3) authorizes contributions "from surplus or reserve funds" of such
amounts as the directors may deem proper; (4) names as eligible recipients the United States or any territory or possession thereof, any
state or political subdivision thereof or any corporation, community
chest fund or foundation organized for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary or educational purposes; (5) limits contributions to any governmental recipient to those made for "public purposes", (6) specifies
that private recipients must be non-profit organizations not substantially engaged in "carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation", (7) validates prior gifts as fully as those made
after the effective date of the statute.
The limitation of the power to "surplus and reserve funds" is of some
importance. The use of these terms is perhaps unfortunate from a technical standpoint. Legislatures have historically been prone to use similar vague expressions in prescribing the conditions under which corporations may lawfully pay dividends. The basic purpose of such statutes
is to permit corporate distributions to shareholders only to the extent
that the value of the assets exceeds debts owing to third persons plus
the liability attributable to issued stock. Statutes attempting to establish such a formula employ such terms as "surplus," "surplus profits,"
''net earnings," "net profits," or approach the matter negatively by
forbidding payment where the effect would be to "impair capital." Al6 Note 1 supra. The Washington statute, in substantial part, appears to have been
patterned on Sec. 23 (q) of the Internal Revenue Code, note 3 .-upra, although there
are substantial differences between the two statutes.
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though the same fundamental idea runs through all of these words or
phrases, litigation inevitably arises in which some peculiar significance
is asserted to rest in the particular language used. The Washington
statute on dividends is quite detailed and specifies the conditions under
which dividends may be paid with considerable certainty.' If, as appears probable, the charitable contributions statute has the same motivation, it would have been preferable to define the conditions for
making such contributions by reference to the dividend statute. In all
probability, however, the courts will reach the same result under the
statute as drawn. It is to be hoped that the use of the words "reserve" in
addition to "surplus" will not be interpreted to justify payments to the
extent of "reserves" created for other specific purposes.
Although -the statute, read literally, purports to validate all charitable
contributions to designated classes of recipients up to the amount of
"surplus and reserve funds," it probably goes no farther than to overcome the possibility of ultra vires attacks. Certainly directors still
should be required to strike some reasonable balance between dividends
and charitable contributions. It would be totally alien to the modern
concept of corporate contributions to charity to permit the directors to
pay all or the lion's share of corporate surplus to charity. To do so
would convert a commercial enterprise into an eleemosynary one. The
familiar limitation of resonableness must be read into the statute. The
real purpose of the act is to relieve the directors of the necessity of
showing some direct connection between the contribution and the business in which the corporation is engaged.
It may also be doubted whether the act will permit directors to favor
charities in which they have strong personal interests to the exclusion
of others. It takes no great imagination to envision shareholder complaint concerning contributions restricted to some particular charity
in which the directors or their wives have an intense personal interest
not shared by the shareholders generally. Some diversification of contributions would no doubt be indicated where such objection appears
probable.
In the final analysis, the act is designed to aid solicitors for those
charities which have, in the past, encountered some resistance because
their projects, though worthy, have no direct connection with a particular corporate enterprise. They can no longer be turned down with the
answer that the corporation would like to contribute but that it would
7RCW 23.24.020, 2324.030, 2324.040 [RRS § 3803-24].
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be contrary to law for it to give to a particular charity, because its
activities bear no resemblance to the corporate business. Boards of directors are now assured that the type of charity is of no moment, so
long as the recipient meets the general statutory standards. The children's hospital, the liberal arts college and the humane society are
qualified to receive charitable contributions from corporations whose
business enterprises may be restricted to the manufacture of rubber
tires or cosmetics or nuts and bolts. Whether such corporations are to
contribute to such charities is, within reasonable limitations as to
amount, a matter of director discretion unfettered by the ultra vires
doctrine.
J. GoRnoN GosE

CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Labor Liens-Restaurant,Hotel, Tavern, Etc. Employees. Chapter
205 gives to persons performing labor in the operation of "any restaurant, hotel, tavern, or other place of business engaged in the selling of
prepared foods or drinks, or any hotel service employee" a lien on the
earnings of and the property used in the operation of, the "said business." It will require litigation to determine precisely what business
institutions fall within the statutory coverage. The reference to restaurants and taverns is clear enough. The reference to "hotel--or any hotel
service employee" is unclear. Does it mean that all hotel employees are
beneficiaries of the statute, or only those engaged in "service" employment or employment concerned with the selling of food or drink?
The statutory language "or other place of business engaged in the
selling of prepared foods or drinks" is a particularly fruitful source of
controversy The statute does not read "engaged solely in the selling",
it refers to hotels, whose food and drink dispensing business is but a
part of the overall activity. What of other institutions a part of whose
operations is the sale of food or drinks? The usual so-called "drug"
store is an example. So is the department store or other mercantile
establishment which operates a soda fountain, lunch counter or dining
room. So is the establishment which operates a cafeteria for its employees. What of the business institution on whose premises a food
or drink vending machine is situated?
That counsel who represents employees of employers like these will
claim the benefits of the statute for their clients would seem fairly
certain. Employees of establishments like grocery stores, markets and
baked goods shops may be tempted too, since these sell food and possi-

